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Chapter 12
Populism and media and communication 
studies in the Nordic countries
Juha Herkman & Ann-Cathrine Jungar
Abstract
This chapter introduces the developments of and research on political actors called 
populist in the Nordic countries. The focus is on contemporary populist right-wing 
parties – the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, and 
the Norwegian Progress Party – though we discuss the history of Nordic populist 
parties on a more general level as well. Nordic research on populism has for the 
most part adopted political scientific, ideational, and empirical perspectives lack-
ing genuine theoretical considerations. However, contextual differences can be 
found, and sociological and cultural approaches to studying populism have been 
promoted of late. The perspective on populism in media and communication stud-
ies has concentrated especially on the political communication of populist actors 
and the relationship between the media and populism. The future challenges for 
Nordic populism studies are linked to changing media and political environments, 
requiring a new look at their relationship.
Keywords: populism, radical right-wing parties, Nordic countries, party system, 
media
Introduction
Populism is difficult to define, being described as a slippery or chameleonic 
concept (Canovan, 2005; Taggart, 2000). Therefore, how populism and re-
search on it are addressed in the Nordic countries depends on how populism is 
defined. If populism is understood, for example, in a Laclaudian (2005) sense 
as “a political logic” where a segment of the population identifies itself with 
“the people” as a total political agent antagonistically confronted by a hegem-
onic power bloc, then populism has been a common process in Nordic politics 
since the late nineteenth century. However, populism in the Nordic region is 
commonly approached from a political scientific and empirical perspective 
and associated with political parties challenging domestic party systems and 
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more traditional mass parties. Therefore, populism in the Nordic countries is 
currently manifesting itself as so-called new populism, that is, in the form of 
populist radical-right political parties – which have been emerging in the late 
twentieth century in many European countries.
New populism has been characterised as anti-establishment protest move-
ments criticising bureaucratised states and the alleged corruption of established 
elites and parties (Taggart, 2000). Several scholars have connected it to na-
tionalism and to a “nativist ideology” consisting of anti-immigration policies, 
xenophobia, and the racism of extreme or radical right-wing movements (see 
Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2004). Such sentiments are often combined with a 
general criticism of the European Union as a political project restricting na-
tional sovereignty.
In this chapter, we provide a comparative review of the developments of 
political populism and its relationship to media and communication studies in 
the Nordic countries. Starting with a short historical introduction of political 
actors called “populists” in the Nordic countries, we then focus on Nordic 
research on populism that has applied especially to political sciences, media 
and communication studies, sociology, and cultural studies. After the research 
review, we then discuss the similarities and differences between populism in the 
different Nordic countries, while also explaining in part the variation in research 
approaches used in the Nordic region. We conclude by briefly reflecting on 
the challenges that populism research currently faces in the Nordic countries.
Populist actors in the Nordic countries
Historically, populism in the Nordic countries has been connected to particu-
lar political parties, mainly to the Finnish Rural Party (1959–1995), the Finns 
Party (1995–), the Danish Progress Party (1972–), the Danish People’s Party 
(1995–), the Norwegian Progress Party (1973–), New Democracy (1991–2000) 
in Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (1988–), and the Best Party (2009–2014) in 
Iceland. In addition, a populist style has been linked to individual politicians 
mainly representing the parties listed above. Populism has also been connected 
to other minor movements, and some mainstream political players have oc-
casionally been called populists.
Jungar (2017) has identified three waves of Nordic populist movements. 
First, the “agrarian populist” wave was seen in the late 1950s in Finland, with 
the establishment of the Finnish Rural Party. The second wave appeared in the 
early 1970s in Denmark and Norway, during which anti-taxation protest parties 
were electorally successful. The third wave emerged in the late 1980s, when the 
nationalist and nativist Sweden Democrats was launched and populist parties 
in Finland, Denmark, and Norway began to adopt anti-immigration policies 
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as an important part of their agenda. Jungar (2017) calls this last wave “new 
populism”, even if some other scholars do not associate the term self-evidently 
with extreme nationalism or anti-immigration policies.
The first wave:  
Agrarian populism of the Finnish Rural Party
The Finnish Rural Party [Suomen Maaseudun Puolue] (SMP) was established 
in 1959 when its founder Veikko Vennamo separated with his followers from 
the Agrarian Party [Maalaisliitto], the predecessor to today’s Centre Party 
[Suomen Keskusta]. The party was popular, especially among small farmers 
suffering from the effects of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation policies. 
It combined anti-establishment appeals with leftist socioeconomic policies and 
conservative values. The party was somewhat popular in local elections in the 
1960s, but enjoyed heavy success in the 1970 parliamentary elections, in which 
it gained 18 members of parliament (MPs) by promoting a strong anti-elite 
approach while appealing to “the pure people”.
SMP experienced internal conflicts during the 1970s, but it made an elec-
toral comeback in the 1983 parliamentary elections, receiving 10 per cent of 
the vote (17 MPs), and was invited to take part in the government. SMP had 
previously not been considered a party with governmental credibility due to 
its criticism of Finland’s specific foreign policy relations with the Soviet Union. 
After the death of the long-serving President Urho Kekkonen in 1983, who had 
personified a friendly relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union dur-
ing the Cold War, SMP was rehabilitated. Moreover, Pekka Vennamo, the far 
less antagonistic and provocative son of Veikko, had been elected party leader, 
which paved the way to governmental incumbency. Assuming governmental 
responsibility resulted, though, both in petty internal disagreements and electoral 
decline. SMP went bankrupt after the 1995 parliamentary elections, in which 
the party won only one seat.
The second wave:  
Anti-taxation protests in Denmark and in Norway
The second Nordic wave of populism was economically liberal in nature. The 
Danish and Norwegian progress parties were critical of the growth of the 
tax-based welfare states. The Danish Progress Party [Fremskridspartiet] was 
established in 1972 and received 15 per cent of the vote in the 1973 parliamen-
tary elections (Jungar, 2017). The party was strongly personified by its popular 
leader, the lawyer Mogens Glistrup, whose provocative and folkish style dif-
ferentiated him from other politicians. The party gained its best result in the 
first parliamentary elections in 1973, with 28 seats in parliament, by adopting 
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a strong anti-taxation protest agenda seemingly reflecting the “voice of ordi-
nary people”. However, the party’s organisation remained loose and centred 
on its leader, contributing to a continuous decline in support. Glistrup also 
used nationalist and anti-Islamic rhetoric, especially during the 1980s, though 
the issue of anti-immigration only became more salient in the 1990s with the 
Danish People’s Party [Dansk Folkeparti] (DF) (Bächler & Hopmann, 2017). 
In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Progress Party won only four seats, 
and in 2001 it lost all of them. After that, the party for the most part lost its 
significance in the Danish political field.
In Norway, Anders Lange’s anti-taxation movement was established in 1973. 
The party received 5 per cent of the vote that same year in the parliamentary 
election, but after Lange’s sudden death in 1974, the leader-centric protest move-
ment encountered difficulties (E. H. Allern, 2013). The party changed its name 
to the Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet] (FrP) and its longstanding leader, Carl 
I. Hagen (1978–2006), began invoking a strong neoliberal ideology. Basically, 
FrP is the only political party called populist in Norway, even though intellec-
tually driven, anti-establishment, and anti-EU movements were titled Populist 
Work Groups in the early 1970s (Jupskås et al., 2017). During the 1980s, FrP 
started to promote anti-immigration approaches and its popularity began to 
increase (Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000). In the 1989 parliamentary elections, 
FrP experienced a parliamentary breakthrough and gained 13 per cent of the 
vote and 22 seats in parliament.
The third wave:  
Nativism and the anti-immigration approach take over
Sweden was described for years as a European exception with no right-wing 
populist parties having successfully gained a seat in parliament (Rydgren, 2002). 
The anti-establishment and economically liberal New Democracy Party [Ny 
Demokrati] was elected to parliament for one term between 1991 and 1994, but 
it was not before 2010, with the rise of Sweden Democrats [Sverigedemokra-
terna] (SD), that a nationalist party gained seats in the Swedish parliament 
(Strömbäck et al., 2017).
SD was formed already in 1988, but with its background in neo-Nazi 
movements, the party remained marginal and was excluded from collaboration 
with other political parties and mainstream media (Baas, 2014). The first party 
leader, Anders Klarström (1992–1995), had a background in neo-Nazism, but 
soon thereafter the new party leader, Mikael Jansson (1995–2005), started to 
distance the party from its extremist legacy. The current party leader, Jimmie 
Åkesson (2005–), has continued to transform SD by building up a nationwide 
party organisation and taking distance from its past. Over 100 members have 
been expelled, and the Sweden Democratic Youth organisation was dissolved 
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in 2015 with the aim of developing a more electorally attractive party with 
governing potential.
Even though social conservatism was added as a second ideological pillar 
to nationalism in the party programme of 2011, anti-immigration is the most 
salient issue for SD voters. SD gained almost 13 per cent of the vote in the 2014 
parliamentary elections, and in the 2018 elections the party received 17.5 per 
cent of the vote, making it the third largest party in the country. However, SD 
still remains isolated because no other party is prepared to collaborate with it 
in government. Nevertheless, the political parties have taken different stances 
towards SD after the 2018 elections. The process of forming a government was 
complicated and put a (temporary) end to the two-bloc dynamics in Swedish 
politics. In 2019, the party leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Conservative Party met with SD and announced that they would cooperate in 
policies where they have shared interests, such as immigration, criminal policies, 
and nuclear power. 
DF was established in 1995 by former members of the Progress Party who 
were dissatisfied with the weak organisation of their party. Pia Kjærsgaard 
was elected as the first party leader of DF. Her aim was to establish an an-
ti-immigration and EU-sceptic political party that would be able to influence 
policy-making by building up an efficient and centralised party organisation. 
In the parliamentary elections of 1995, the party received 7.4 per cent of the 
vote, and DF acted as a support party to centre-right coalition governments 
from 2001 to 2011. From this position, DF was able to influence immigration 
policies. The party succeeded in growing its electoral support, which varied 
between 12 and 14 per cent in Denmark’s parliamentary elections during the 
2000s. In the 2015 parliamentary election, the party received 21.1 per cent 
of the vote and was the second largest party after the Social Democrats. Pia 
Kjærsgaard stepped aside after the 2011 election and was replaced by the new 
leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who also was a founding member of DF.
With Thulesen Dahl, DF continued to primarily focus on nationalist and 
nativist approaches confronting “the Danish people” with respect to immigrants 
– especially Muslims – and the European Union (see Bächler & Hopmann, 
2017). The party also adopted a more centrist socioeconomic position. In the 
2019 parliamentary elections, the electoral growth of DF came to a halt: DF 
received only 8.7 per cent of the vote and lost 21 seats. The mainstream parties 
both to the right and the left had adopted the immigration and migration pol-
icies of DF, and the Social Democrats, in particular, were successful in taking 
votes away from DF. Moreover, in the 2019 election, DF faced competition 
from two even more extreme parties – the New Right [Nye Borgerlige] and 
Hard Line [Stram Kurs].
The Finns Party, previously the True Finns [Perussuomalaiset] (PS) was 
likewise established in 1995 as a successor party to SMP. The long-standing 
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leader of the party, Timo Soini (1997–2017), was the last party secretary of 
SMP, carrying forward the original populist spirit of an agrarian “heartland” 
(Taggart, 2000). However, PS became electorally more popular only after Soini 
started to flirt with nationalist and nativist agitators, such as the late MP Tony 
Halme and party’s current leader, Jussi Halla-aho, who came to be known as 
a leading anti-immigration figure through his blog writings during the 2000s. 
PS enjoyed success in the 2008 local elections, but in “big bang” parliamentary 
elections of 2011, the party surprised everyone by receiving 19.1 per cent of 
the vote (Arter, 2012).
PS refused offers to join the government and remained in opposition, securing 
17.7 per cent of popular support in the 2015 elections. However, after the 2015 
elections, PS opted to participate in the conservative right-wing government. 
At the 2017 party conference, PS split when Jussi Halla-aho and his followers 
were elected as party leaders. Since then, PS has continued in opposition as a 
clearly radical right-wing party, whereas Soini and his followers remained in 
government, forming the new Blue Reform Party [Sininen tulevaisuus]. In the 
2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, the Blue Reform Party did not receive any 
parliamentary seats. In turn, PS became the second largest parliamentary party, 
with 17.5 per cent of the vote, only 0.2 per cent less than the Social Democratic 
Party. In party polls taken in autumn 2019, PS showed a support rate of more 
than 24 per cent, making it the largest party in Finland.
In Norway, FrP was the most successful in the 2009 parliamentary elections, 
in which the party received almost 23 per cent of the vote with its new leader, 
Siv Jensen (2006–). According to opinion polls, support for the party topped 
30 per cent in 2008, but the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Anders Behring 
Breivik in Oslo and on Utøya Island in the summer of 2011 had dampening 
effects on anti-immigrant rhetoric in the country (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014). 
However, even if it then lost some of its popularity, FrP remained the third 
largest party in 2013 and joined a minority government together with the 
Conservative Party [Høyre], supported by the Liberal Party [Venstre] and the 
Christian People’s Party [Kristelig Folkeparti]. The government reformed after 
the parliamentary elections of 2017, and the support parties were included as 
partners in the new government.
However, the internal level of conflict increased within government after the 
broadening of the governmental base, and FrP left the cabinet in January 2020. 
FrP could not accept the decision of the other three coalition parties to bring 
back to Norway a 29-year-old Norwegian woman with Pakistani background 
and her sick child – who had lived in the ISIS-controlled area of Syria – from the 
al-Hol detention camp. FrP perceived that it had been unsuccessful in obtaining 
support for tougher immigration and integration policies, such as the restriction 
of immigrants and family reunification. Support for FrP had dropped in the 
opinion polls and, now once again removed from governmental responsibility, 
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FrP could fight the 2021 election campaign as an opposition party. As such, 
with its 45-year lifespan and seven years in government, FrP has been the most 
long-lived successful populist party in the Nordic countries.
Contemporary Nordic populism:  
Part of the radical right-wing–party family
Discussion about populism in the contemporary Nordic context is generally 
in reference to four nationally successful right-wing populist parties (see Table 
12.1). Historically, the Nordic populist parties have ideologically converged 
and are today part of the Nordic, as well as the European, radical-right-party 
family (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). They increasingly cooperate bilaterally and 
transnationally: SD, PS, and DF are members of the same party groups in the 
Nordic Council (Nordic Freedom), whereas they are currently divided in the 
European Parliament. Until the European elections of 2019, the parties were 
members of the Europe of Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). After the 2019 
elections, SD remained in the ECR, whereas PS and DF joined the more radical 
Identity and Democracy group, which also includes the Lega (Italy), the National 
Rassemblement (France), and the Austrian Freedom Party. FrP refrains from 
collaborating with the other Nordic populist parties, as they are perceived as 
being too extreme. Instead, the party has had bilateral contacts with the Liberal 
Party in Denmark and the Republican Party in the US.
Iceland has not experienced right-wing populist movements similar to the oth-
er Nordic countries. Even if Iceland can be linked to similar media and political 
systems as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, the remarkably smaller size 
of the media market, its geographic location, and particular political tradition 
make Iceland somehow a different case than the other Nordic “democratic 
corporatist” countries (Hardarson, 2008; see also Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, 
Chapter 3). However, just as populism in different forms surges in popularity 
in response to political and other types of crises, Icelandic populism has been 
connected especially to the collapse of the banking sector in 2008, which shocked 
the whole country. During the crisis, comedian Jón Gnarr strongly attacked 
Icelandic politicians and banks and won the local Reykjavik elections in 2010 
as head of the satirically named Best Party [Besti flokkurin]. Gnarr served as 
mayor of Reykjavik from 2010 to 2014, but his populism cannot be associated 
with that of radical right-wing parties in the other Nordic countries – it has 
rather been compared to the Italian comedian Giuseppe “Beppe” Grillo and 
the early Five Star Movement [Movimento 5 Stelle] with its strong demands 
for direct democracy (Boyer, 2013). The Progressive Party has also been called 
a representative of “softer version” of populism for its explicitly nationalist 
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Table 12.1 Contemporary right-wing populist parties in Nordic parliaments
Source: Compiled by the authors
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Research on populism in the Nordic countries
A literature review on populism research in the four Nordic countries was car-
ried out as part of a large-scale, COST-funded project (European Cooperation 
in Science and Technology), in which a communication perspective on populism 
was emphasised (Aalberg et al., 2017). The studies covered the period until 2015, 
and much has happened since then. However, the main arguments crystallised 
in the literature review are still valid for this chapter.
First, even though some theoretical efforts to conceptualise and define pop-
ulism have appeared in the Nordic context (e.g., Jupskås, 2013), the majority 
of populism research has been empirical. As the authors of previous studies 
remind us, the Nordic definitions of populism vary from popular discourse’s 
irresponsible vote-seeking strategies to more nuanced discussions of populism 
as ideology or style. However, in all countries, the definitions of populism rely 
most often on those proposed by key scholars of the topic, namely Cas Mudde, 
Paul Taggart, and Margaret Canovan (Jupskås et al., 2017). The definition of 
populism with perhaps the most widespread support among current Nordic 
populism researchers is presented by Mudde (2007: 23): 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people. 
However, the definition is often supplemented by the ideas of “heartland” 
(Taggart, 2000) – the nostalgic yearning for an idealised (national) past – and 
populism as a non-liberal “shadow of democracy” (Canovan, 1999). Likewise, 
Moffitt’s (2017) ideas of populism as a political style have recently been applied 
by Nordic scholars.
Second, most of the research has been connected to the Nordic populist 
political parties discussed in the previous section. Thus, contemporary Nordic 
right-wing populist parties and their predecessors have been studied, for ex-
ample, as part of election studies to find out how these parties can be defined 
ideologically in contrast to other parties, why these parties have been supported, 
and who votes for them (e.g., E. H. Allern, 2013; Jupskås, 2013; Klages, 2003; 
Rydgren, 2004; Widfeldt, 2008). In regard to these themes, comparative analyses 
between two or more countries have also been conducted (e.g., Jungar, 2017; 
Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Rydgren, 2010; Widfeldt, 2014). During the early 
2000s, Swedish researchers focused particularly on the “exceptionality of Swe-
den” in European party politics because no radical right-wing populist party 
had received many votes before the electoral success of SD in 2010 (Rydgren, 
2002; see also Strömbäck et al., 2017).
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Most of the above empirical studies can be categorised as an “ideational 
approach to populism” (Mudde, 2017). The main point behind the ideational 
approach is that populism is linked to ideologies or a “set of ideas”. With the 
ideational approach, populism is seen as a Manichean angle in relation to the 
political world, equating Good with “the will of the pure people” and Evil with 
a conspiring elite. According to the ideational approach, populism also stands in 
opposition to pluralism by emphasising the unity of the majority (Mudde, 2017).
The question of normativity is perhaps the most crucial issue separating 
different populism studies in the Nordic countries from each other. As already 
mentioned, much of the research treats populism rather neutrally as an empirical 
research subject, but some scholars take a more critical stance towards populism, 
seeing it as a negative phenomenon and even as a threat to democracy (see 
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Some of the studies do not provide a definition for 
populism, but instead treat it as a commonplace idea referring to irresponsible 
vote-seeking strategies or even openly xenophobic rhetoric, while others identify 
populism with extreme right-wing movements and with historical connections 
to the totalitarian Nazi and Fascist regimes (see Müller, 2016). These kinds of 
approaches are common in popular scientific and politically-laden analyses 
(e.g., Baas, 2014) as well as in some academic studies (e.g., Pyrhönen, 2015). 
Such a normative perspective can be explained by the fact that contemporary 
populist parties in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway represent radical 
right-wing populism with exclusive anti-immigration attitudes, and populism 
in general is often associated with these attitudes. 
Another specialty in the Nordic research on populism is an emphasis on 
Laclau’s (2005) populism theory among a group of Finnish scholars (e.g., Ko-
vala et al., 2018; Palonen, 2009). As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, 
Laclau (2005) defines populism ontologically as a discursive process of political 
reasoning by which a group of people identifies as “the people” – as a total 
political agent – and antagonistically confronts other groups of the population, 
such as “the elite”. In this sense, Laclau’s definition is rather reminiscent of, 
for example, Mudde’s (2007) definition of populism and has also been linked 
to the ideational approach. However, what makes the Laclaudian tradition 
different from ideational approaches is its background in neo-Marxian radical 
democracy theory with strong normative emphases. Laclau developed together 
with Mouffe a theory of radical democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
which they associated progressive societal movements with populist discursive 
identification and signification processes (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Therefore, 
for Laclau and Mouffe, populism represents a positive possibility for societal 
change, political mobilisation, and challenging hegemonic power – even if 
Mouffe (2005) has also concerned herself with the negative effects of exclusive 
right-wing populism in the European political field.
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Media and communication studies’ perspectives  
on populism
When it comes to the communication dimension of populism, the COST-project 
mentioned above emphasised such an approach and included almost all Eu-
ropean countries in addition to the Nordic region (see Aalberg et al., 2017). 
Essential in the communication approach to populism is the fact that populism 
is understood as a specific type of communication rather than as particular move-
ments, ideologies, or political actors. As such, almost all political agents can 
employ populist political communication, in which the main characteristics are 
people-centrism and an anti-elite appeal or discrimination against out-groups, 
such as immigrants or sexual and ethnic minorities (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
The empirical analyses of the COST-project have in particular included the 
Nordic countries Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (Reinemann et al., 2019).
Even though the communication perspective on populism as a specific and 
systematic approach is rather recent, several scholars have been studying the 
populist style of political communication in the Nordic countries for some time 
(e.g., Hatakka et al., 2017; Hellström & Hervik, 2014; Ylä-Anttila, 2017). Most 
of these studies have concentrated on the populist political communication of 
the new right-wing parties defined in the previous section. Some of the studies 
focus especially on the populist style and rhetoric of the populist right-wing party 
leaders (e.g., Klages, 2003; Niemi, 2013). However, current communication 
studies are increasingly focusing on the social media and online communication 
strategies of populist actors (e.g., Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015).
Another important group of communication studies has specialised in the 
relationship between journalism – or “the media” – and populism. Extensive 
content analyses of the media attention given to the Nordic populist parties have 
been carried out especially in Sweden (Ljunggren & Nordstrand, 2010) and in 
Finland (Pernaa & Railo, 2012) after the groundbreaking election success of SD 
and PS in the early 2010s. Also, more theoretical and general approaches have 
been taken to the relationship between the media and populism (e.g., Andersson, 
2010; Niemi & Houni, 2018). Herkman (2017) compared the media attention 
given to all four Nordic right-wing populist parties from the perspective of the 
so-called life-cycle model, in which the developments of the populist parties 
and resulting media attention are categorised via different life phases.
A common claim has been that populist politicians and leaders are charis-
matic, or at least expressive, in their communication style compared to other 
politicians. Indeed, some scholars have demonstrated the expressive power of, 
for example, the late leader of the Danish Progress Party, Mogens Glistrup 
(Klages, 2003), and the former leader of the Finns Party, Timo Soini (Niemi, 
2013) – although, as Bächler and Hopmann (2017) argue, much of these discus-
sions illustrate the populist communication style linked to the Nordic populist 
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parties in general rather than rely on systematic analysis. Instead, much of the 
communication analysis of the Nordic populist actors focuses more on their 
content or agenda than on their style. Especially in Denmark and Sweden, re-
search has demonstrated how right-wing populist actors have concentrated on 
issues related to immigration and have had remarkable agenda-setting power in 
these debates (e.g., Hellström & Hervik, 2014; Rydgren, 2010). Some studies 
have also been carried out on gender (e.g., Norocel, 2013), demonstrating a 
general trend towards identity and morality-based framings in populist com-
munication (e.g., Vigsø, 2012).
Expressive, morality-based communication is highly effective because it 
emphasises emotional public debates connected to populist actors. Wodak 
(2015: 19–20) uses the phrase “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile” to 
describe the tendency of these actors to use continuous provocations, such as 
insults and exaggerations, to gain public attention in the mainstream media. 
Analyses of the late leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, and 
Donald Trump prove the success of this kind of communication strategy in 
practice (e.g., Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Wodak, 2015). The number 
of public scandals linked to right-wing populist parties, especially in Finland 
and Sweden, also increased remarkably during the early 2010s, indicating the 
provocativeness of the Nordic populist communication style (Herkman, 2018). 
It seems that public scandals even contribute to the success of the movements 
because their supporters interpret scandals as “witch hunts” carried out by 
political and media elites.
Paradoxically, it seems that public scandals linked to FrP and PS have not 
decreased when these parties have become serious players in the governing 
cabinets, which can be explained by a “double-speech strategy” in which the 
leading figures of the parties appear to take a constructive approach and behave 
decently, whereas other party members appeal to the radical supporters with 
provocative and even insulting statements (e.g., Hatakka et al., 2017).
A common strategy of populist actors has also been to play the role of under-
dog in relation to the mainstream media by claiming that they receive, at least 
compared to other political parties, less and overly distorted media attention 
(Mazzoleni, 2008). However, the quantitative mappings of media coverage 
during the election campaigns demonstrate that the amount of media attention 
given to the Nordic right-wing populist parties has been relatively high (e.g., 
Ljunggren & Nordstrand, 2010; Pernaa & Railo, 2012), with the media quite 
often critically discussing the nationalist and nativist approaches promoted by 
these parties (Herkman, 2016).
There is some evidence that the popular press has been more positive towards 
domestic populist parties than the so-called prestige media (Herkman, 2017; 
Klages, 2003). In Norway, the commercial broadcaster has been seen as more 
populist and sympathetic to FrP than the public service broadcaster (Jupskås et 
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al., 2017). However, there are clear differences between the Nordic countries; 
Sweden has differed especially with almost exclusive critical media attention 
being focused on the domestic populist party SD, whereas in Denmark, Norway, 
and Finland, positive attention has also been promoted (Hellström & Hervik, 
2014; Herkman, 2017).
As the liberal journalistic media tends to be critical of nationalism and the 
nativism promoted by the radical right-wing populist parties, social media has 
become a fruitful platform for their community formation and independent 
communication (Krämer, 2017). Several studies on the online communication 
of right-wing populist actors in the Nordic countries have found examples of 
more radical rhetoric (Hatakka, 2019; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016), direct ap-
peals to the people (Niemi, 2013), and different platform strategies compared 
to mainstream parties (Larson & Kalsnes, 2014). However, the Nordic right-
wing populist parties’ online communication usually becomes more mainstream 
when they turn popular (cf. Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015). In contrast, Hatakka’s 
(2019) study demonstrates the tendency to polarisation and the strengthening 
of extreme voices in populist online communication. There is clearly still a need 
for further analyses of online communication linked to Nordic populist parties.
Similarities between Nordic populist parties
The Nordic countries are typical representatives of consensual multiparty 
democracies based on the welfare state model. This may partly explain why 
populist parties have been successful for a long time in these political systems; 
the consensual establishment can easily be labelled a “corrupt elite” by populists. 
Even if some country-specific differences can be found, the Nordic countries have 
been characterised as examples of the so-called democratic corporatist model 
of political and media systems, in which a reliance on corporative consensual 
decision-making is scrutinised by a highly professional and autonomous com-
mercial media accompanied by strong public service broadcasting (Strömbäck 
et al., 2008). Populism in the Nordic countries is generally not seen as offensive 
in style as in Southern and Eastern European countries, where politics is tradi-
tionally more confrontational. For example, according to the European Social 
Survey, the supporters of the Nordic populist parties are quite different than 
the supporters of extremist populist movements elsewhere, because the former 
support a democratic society and want to be integrated within it (Mesežnikov 
et al., 2008).
However, as the Nordic populist parties did not garner greater success until 
they began to intensively criticise immigration in the 1990s and especially the 
twenty-first century, they are not that different from other successful European 
right-wing populist parties belonging to the same radical right-wing–party fam-
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ily. They combine authoritarian policies – anti-immigration, traditional family 
values, and demands for stricter policies on crime – with socioeconomic centrist 
positions, such as tax-based redistribution of wealth, welfare chauvinism, a 
state-regulated market, and protectionism (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Immigra-
tion and law and order are the most important issues for all four parties. For 
SD and PS, social and moral issues outrank economic policies, and in the case 
of DF they are roughly equal. FrP is the only party for which economic issues 
are significantly more important than social and moral policies, although still 
not as salient as immigration and law and order (Bakker et al., 2012).
In all four countries, some of the most radical members of the right-wing 
populist parties have also faced public scandals and even court cases for making 
racist or discriminatory statements (see Herkman, 2018). In general, the rhetoric 
promoted by these parties on, for example, immigration, does not differ from 
the rhetoric of other European populist right-wing players to the extent that it 
would be possible to agree that the parties are quite different. The whole Nordic 
system has obviously turned towards the liberal model with more market-driven 
media and polarised political communication than before, making provocative 
political communication increasingly more normal (Herkman, 2009; Ohlson, 
2015). Let us also not forget the changes that digitalisation and the spread of 
social media have had on the Nordic media systems as well, making populist 
political communication more accessible and salient than before. In practice, 
the populist parties have also become more similar over the years, whereas the 
populist parties in Norway, Denmark, and Finland have turned from traditional 
anti-elite protest movements into nativist right-wing parties, and SD, for its 
part, has changed from a neo-Nazi extreme right-wing movement into a radical 
right-wing populist party (Jungar, 2017).
Contextual differences in Nordic populism
In spite of the systemic, policy, and organisational similarities, there are dif-
ferences between the populist political parties in the Nordic countries deriving 
from their different histories and particular political and cultural contexts. Since 
DF and FrP gained established positions in their domestic party systems earlier 
than PS and SD, they have somehow been normalised and become mainstream, 
whereas PS and especially SD are still particularities or anomalies in their politi-
cal fields (Herkman, 2017). This applies especially to their parliamentary status 
and the media attention they receive. 
The parliamentary experiences have also differed for the four Nordic parties. 
FrP joined a centre-right government 40 years after its formation, and in 2013, 
its experience with governing has been positive both in terms of policy and 
votes. FrP has been able to influence policy-making and has not experienced 
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any major incumbency effect in terms of its electoral support in government 
until recently. The governmental experience of PS has been quite different. PS 
joined a centre-right government after the parliamentary elections of 2015. As 
the party had to compromise on immigration, bailouts to euro-zone countries, 
and cutbacks in welfare provisions, its electoral support decreased rapidly, 
and the party split when Jussi Halla-aho was elected as party leader in 2017. 
The cordon sanitaire that was put on PS in 2017 has remained. However, such 
isolation was no obstacle to PS’s success in the 2019 parliamentary elections. 
The fact that PS’s party organisation remained intact after the split, that the 
party maintained its economic resources, and that it could benefit from being 
in the opposition are obvious explanations for its electoral fortunes.
When DF was formed in 1995 as a splinter of the Danish Progress Party, 
the main ambition of the party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, was to form a well-or-
ganised party that could influence policy-making. Between 2001–2011 and 
2015–2019, DF acted as a support party to centre-right minority governments. 
This parliamentary position allowed the party to influence Danish immigration 
and migration policies, which transformed radically during this period – with-
out experiencing the electoral costs of governmental incumbency. This was 
the case until the latest parliamentary elections of 2019, in which DF suffered 
an electoral setback due to both increased competition from the mainstream 
parties that have adapted to the immigration policies of the DF and from the 
new, more extreme parties.
SD has been met with an isolationist strategy, a so-called cordon sanitaire, 
since it made its parliamentary breakthrough in 2010. Its historic origins in 
extremism and radical immigration policies have been the motivations for the 
refusal to negotiate with SD. However, with the continued electoral growth of 
the party and the resulting blackmailing position of SD, the process of forming 
a government has become quite complicated in Sweden: neither the left-green 
coalition nor the centre-right alliance control a proper majority anymore. 
However, the isolationist strategy has not prevented the electoral growth of 
SD nor the indirect influence of SD on agenda-setting or other political players 
increasingly adapting to SD’s immigration policies. These kinds of contextual 
differences also explain the different levels of media attention that the four 
Nordic populist parties receive, because political publicity is inherently linked to 
such party parameters as government opposition positions and minister offices.
Contextual differences also partly explain the different stances of the domestic 
populist players in public political communication. Even if several public com-
motions have been linked to DF, SD, and PS, Herkman’s (2018) study shows 
that between 2005–2015 only one of those affairs turned into a national scandal 
with longstanding and wide-ranging media attention in Denmark, whereas in 
Sweden and Finland they resulted in several large national scandals. Herkman 
(2018) explains the result by the differences in political cultures, in which the 
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Danish context is seen as more tolerant of nativist provocations than, for ex-
ample, the Swedish or Finnish contexts. Several studies have demonstrated that 
so-called media populism (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2014), in which the Danish media 
bolsters the confrontation between ordinary citizens and the political elite and 
uses us-against-them appeals, has been common in Denmark (see Bächler & 
Hopmann, 2017). Another reason for the greater tolerance and normalisation of 
anti-immigration rhetoric in Denmark compared to the other Nordic countries 
may reside in the legacy of the Muhammad cartoon crisis, which was a decisive 
and repoliticising event for Danish political communication in 2005–2006 
(Esmark & Ørsten, 2008).
The overall analysis of political scandals in the Nordic region also re-
veals that Sweden has been more fertile soil for scandals compared to other 
Nordic countries during the 2000s, indicating less tolerance for misconduct 
in political culture and a more aggressive media (S. Allern et al., 2012). 
However, at the same time, Swedish political communication has been called 
“politics friendly”, meaning that it focuses rather seriously on daily politics 
(Strömbäck & Nord, 2008: 118). This has anchored the Swedish media to 
the political cordon sanitaire against the SD and can be seen in comparative 
studies, illustrating that DF, FrP, and PS are more similar to other political 
parties than SD in terms of the media attention they receive (Hellström & 
Hervik, 2014; Herkman, 2017).
Norway differs from other Nordic countries in the sense that even if most 
Norwegian scholars tend to agree that FrP can be categorised as a populist party 
(Jupskås et al., 2017), the term populism has not been connected as eagerly to 
the party, and populism has often been located somewhere other than Norway 
(Herkman, 2016). The long history of FrP and its participation in government 
have gradually normalised the party, making it more reminiscent of traditional 
conservative right-wing movements than its Nordic counterparts – even if FrP’s 
strong emphasis on a nativist anti-immigration approach clearly connects it to 
the populist radical right-wing–party family and to other contemporary populist 
parties in the Nordic countries (see Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Some analyses 
have indicated that the nationalist-patriotic appeals to the people might be 
more common in the Norwegian party system than in other Nordic countries 
(Jupskås, 2013), thus making a populist communication style perhaps more 
legitimate in Norway than in other Nordic countries.
Conclusion: Challenges in populism research
The success of right-wing populist movements indicates in part the radical chal-
lenges to and changes in the formerly rather enduring party systems of the Nordic 
countries (Arter, 2012). It is important to be sensitive to these transformations 
257
12. POPULISM AND MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
by approaching them through multiple theoretical perspectives involving both 
institutional and cultural dimensions. Acknowledging at least three challenges 
is essential for the future understanding of and research on Nordic populism: 1) 
the ambiguities in definitions of populism, 2) the normative challenges caused 
by populism, and 3) the changing media environment.
One of the biggest challenges in populism research in general is the ambi-
guity in the very definition of populism, which contributes to difficulties in 
operationalisations of empirical research design. Therefore, scholars debate 
which political actors should be called populist and by what means. The debate 
on whether FrP is a populist party or not indicates this problem in the Nordic 
context, where right-wing populist parties have gained a rather established 
position and started to become normal players in their political field. Further-
more, there are scholars who claim that many of the right-wing radical parties 
currently called populist should rather be called nationalist – at least from a 
Laclaudian perspective (Stavrakakis et al., 2017). This also applies to the Nor-
dic region, where traditional anti-elitist populism has been transformed into 
ethno-nationalist efforts to exclude outgroups such as immigrants. Therefore, 
there is also still a clear need for context-sensitive theorisations on populism 
in Nordic academia.
Secondly, the question of normativity in populism research derives from 
the challenge, and even threat, that the right-wing populist parties obviously 
pose to liberal-democratic values such as equality, basic human rights, and 
especially minority rights, making many scholars critical of (radical-right) pop-
ulism in general and the associated political parties in particular (see Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2012). However, this may lead to one-dimensional interpretations 
and self-evident results in the research. Thus, more reflection is also needed 
regarding normative assumptions linked to populism in the Nordic context. 
The communication approach to populism may serve as one way out of these 
challenges (Aalberg et al., 2017), but combining it with ideational and cultural 
approaches may also create a new understanding of normative approaches to 
Nordic populism in the future (e.g., Hatakka, 2019).
Finally, the simultaneous rapid transformation of the media and communi-
cation environment renders the relationship between populism and the media 
even more complicated, demanding of scholars new skills to empirically study 
and theoretically understand populist communication in the contemporary 
“hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013). The changes in the media environ-
ment have helped populist movements enjoy more success and become more 
mainstream or normalised in their political field. Furthermore, all these changes 
together may transform the overall political climate and culture in ways that 
will have more devastating consequences for Nordic political life than we can 
perhaps imagine today.
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